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ATTAINING ROGERS SMITH'S CIVIC IDEALS 
DAVID J. LORENZO 
Jamestown College 
INTRODUCTION 
Rogers Smith's recent work' represents a new start in the academic liberal 
community. Rejecting the tendency to "begin inquiry by constructing highly 
abstract principles, scenarios or hypothetical conditions,"2 he engages in a 
historically grounded normative enterprise.3 Perhaps most welcome is his 
attention to tradition. By recognizing the important role inherited ideas play 
as sources of certainty, comfort, and identity, Smith provides a sophisticated 
explanation for our failure to realize liberal values. His arguments for liberal 
reform therefore pack a welcome empirical punch. 
But are Smith's recommendations for reform practical? An important part 
of his remedy for our liberal shortcomings is eliminating "mythic" descrip- 
tions of our national origins and purposes.4 Smith argues that myths glorify 
our community as a unique and special place. He asserts that discriminatory 
and inequitable citizenship laws often arise when elites manipulate ascriptive 
identities related to this glorification.5 He therefore proposes that we reject 
myths and their associated political identities as the grounds for justifying 
polices and replace them with a critical understanding of history, a tentative 
political identity, and justification through "reflective equilibrium."6 
Can we justify reform and reject all the "mythic" texts Smith associates 
with dangerous forms of identity? I argue that if we define myth, as Smith 
seems to, as a bundle of collectively held texts that celebrate national history, 
describe a natural order, and invoke heroes,7 his prescription fails to account 
fully for the situated political behavior he describes. If we constantly struggle 
to fulfill the promise of liberal ideals within the context of traditions,8 we are 
compelled to employ social texts describing a natural order and invoking 
heroes alongside Smith's critical history. Smith is forced to choose between 
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reform as a political project and his fear of the civic identity multiple texts 
might create. 
SMITH'S ARGUMENT 
By challenging our understanding of American history and civic identity, 
Smith beckons us to embrace a skeptical, pragmatic stance.9 Smith argues 
that our history, correctly understood, reveals a failure to live up to liberal ide- 
als, exposes the reasons for our failures, and helps justify the need for contin- 
ual reform. Civic Ideals, the core of his historical argument, demonstrates 
that U.S. citizenship laws have often been based illiberally on race, gender, 
and other ascriptive characteristics.'1 He locates the origin of those laws in 
celebratory myths and political needs and blames those myths and needs for 
our reluctance to reform." 
Smith's analysis is based on three fundamental premises. The first is that 
civic identity is artificial, because political communities are themselves arti- 
ficial. 2 Civic Ideals begins by asserting liberals no longer accept that citizen- 
ship in a particular state "is sanctioned by divine will and rationally 
discoverable natural aw."'3 We are left to understand how citizenship is con- 
structed. Smith pursues this project by examining the historical evidence citi- 
zenship laws provide and the political and cultural texts that justify those 
laws. This examination, he argues, reveals that our nation's often incoher- 
ently mythical self-depiction has spilled over into the application of norma- 
tive principles.'4 This finding allows Smith to address a basic quandary of 
American life-why we have historically embraced liberalism while time 
and again we have also accepted ascriptive and unequal conceptions of citi- 
zenship. 5 
The second premise holds that liberalism is not and logically cannot be the 
source of ascription. Smith solves the quandary posed by our illiberal heri- 
tage by arguing that partly liberal combinations account for and justify 
ascriptive citizenship laws.16 Pointing to our mixed legacy of Enlightenment 
and Protestant thought, he argues that our political discourse draws upon 
"multiple traditions," including liberalism, republicanism, and various reli- 
gious and racist traditions.17 The latter three are the true sources of ascriptive 
accounts. Americans historically have conceptualized and justified illiberal 
citizenship laws, he asserts, by combining those sources of ascription with 
liberal concepts in celebratory but ultimately incoherent descriptions of our 
origins and destiny.'8 
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The third premise dismisses claims that ascriptive conceptions were pres- 
ent only early in our history, or are really unimportant. Smith insists that 
ascriptive conceptions are present, and importantly so, throughout the history 
of the United States.19 He rejects a purely cultural or narrowly historical 
explanation for the rise of ascriptive citizenship laws and other illiberal poli- 
cies, and embraces one that is political, cultural, and still relevant. He argues 
that politicians and ordinary citizens are continually tempted away from pure 
liberalism toward its fundamentally incoherent combination with other, 
ascriptive traditions. Generalizing from his historical observations, he 
observes that elites are always attracted by the option of playing on the 
masses' identity-related hopes, fears, and appetites to ease the burdens of 
nation building and like to take advantage of the inevitable backlash against 
liberal reform established interests foment.20 The masses are also to blame in 
Smith's description, for he argues they in turn are eager to reward those elites 
who provide them with comfortable, ascriptive accounts of their community 
and narrow, materially advantageous citizenship laws.21 
Smith explains our vulnerability to the politics of ascriptive analysis by 
describing us as self-interested beings in search of existential meaning. He 
suggests that because liberalism recognizes the artificiality of human com- 
munities and political identities, it has difficulty providing the deeply satisfy- 
ing political identity we require for nation building and that it struggles tojus- 
tify the traumatic changes that often accompany liberal reform.22 This 
difficulty leaves people open to the seductively ascriptive stories other tradi- 
tions provide, especially when those stories enhance their self-worth while 
justifying policies that benefit particularistic interests. Due to their self- 
interested search for existential meaning, even citizens who embrace liberal 
values are vulnerable to politicians who manipulate political identity.23 
Given this complex explanation for our failures to realize liberal princi- 
ples, Smith asserts that constructing a civic identity is both necessary and 
dangerous.24 While he affirms that ascriptive identities continue to jeopardize 
our liberal democratic goals, he rejects the views of Rawls, Dewey, and 
Taylor, arguing that their weak commitment to civic identity does not address 
its practical necessity.25 He wishes us to discard earlier forms of civic identity, 
but not abandon the effort of tying citizens to our political community. He 
argues that if we do not build a normatively defensible civic identity, we leave 
ourselves open to ascriptive varieties. The key to a desirable civic identity is 
the rejection of all political myths. Smith maintains that ejecting ascriptive 
myths alone from texts describing our civic identity is insufficient. The cele- 
bratory tone of even liberal myths can lead to the incorporation of ascriptive 
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explanations of our success into our civic identification and thereby lead to 
the justification of illiberal policies.26 
Smith's hostility to myth as a source of liberal civic identity is further bol- 
stered by the conclusions he draws from his analysis of liberalism's philo- 
sophical foundations. Surveying liberalism's modem successes and failures, 
Smith attributes the latter in part to liberalism's inability to provide moral and 
existential certainty.27 Pure liberalism fails politically, he argues, because lib- 
erals are clear headed. Recognizing the incoherence of combining appeals to 
consent with references to natural law or theology, they justify their princi- 
ples on pragmatic grounds. Myths, in contrast, simplify life's complexities in 
satisfying, uncomplicated tales of our origins and destiny. They are attractive 
because they can provide certainty. Liberalism therefore loses out in justifi- 
catory battles built on the "vertical" process of foundational arguments.28 He 
notes that the best liberals can do is "horizontally" justify liberal policies by 
searching for the reflective equilibrium Dewey and Quine champion. This is 
a pragmatic and reformist process whereby we "recurrently compare some of 
our inherited beliefs against others and against our perceived experiences of 
the world." We can only arrive at "preliminary, tentative and uncertain" judg- 
ments at any one time. So far Smith merely identifies moral uncertainty as a 
major problem and implies that we have no choice but to turn to reflective 
equilibrium. Yet he also seems to embrace reflective equilibrium as desir- 
able. He does not want liberals to duck foundational contests over justifica- 
tion only because they lose. He ultimately wants them to embark on a process 
of critical reflection because he does not want them to squander their lucidity. 
Reflective equilibrium preserves the skeptical, pragmatic spirit Smith 
embraces, while foundational justification does not. Thus, insofar as myth 
celebrates certainty and favors foundationalism, it is at odds with Smith's 
allegiance to skeptical pragmaticism as an important attribute of a desirable 
civic identity.29 
Smith ultimately conceptualizes the problem of civic identity in terms of 
committing citizens to our liberal community without glorifying it as special, 
perfect, or the repository of certainty. He urges us not to construct citizenship 
by engaging in highly abstract philosophical discussions of the self.30 Nor 
does he favor a cultural conceptualization. Both tempt us to see ourselves as 
unique or faultless. Instead, consonant with his skeptical pragmaticism, he 
proposes we continually rethink American political history while 
reconceptualizing our community and our connection with it. Smith holds 
that we should embrace and highlight our nation's shortcomings as well as its 
triumphs. We should reject myths because they merely exalt us and white- 
wash our history. By rejecting myth, we can eliminate compulsion and cul- 
Lorenzo / ATTAINING SMITH'S CIVIC IDEALS 361 
tural identity and instead emphasize political voluntarism and liberal ideals. 
His model of civic attachment, which balances identity with the critical dis- 
tance he craves, is membership in a political "party of America." That form of 
identity, he argues, is desirable because it is transparently artificial and volun- 
tary and holds its membership together by a combination of a normative 
vision, a shared history, and pragmatic appeals to instrumental good.31 
SMITH, "MYTH," AND 
JUSTIFYING LIBERAL REFORM 
Smith's concern with defining the correct form of civic identity and elimi- 
nating myth is pragmatic. He argues that incorrect forms of civic identity and 
the acceptance of myths complicate the project of justifying and tying people 
to liberalism and liberal reform. Liberalism's foundations are weak and 
therefore lose out to myths in the battle for certainty. Liberal reform threatens 
comfortable identities and established interests, thereby spurring defenses of 
the status quo and making ascriptive laws materially and psychologically 
attractive. It is fair to say that despite the considerable energy he spends out- 
lining the task of justifying liberalism and liberal reform, he is not sanguine 
about liberal justification. He seems to pin most of his hopes on liberal 
accomplishments in the practical realms of political and administrative struc- 
tures, economics, family and individual life, society, and economics.32 The 
best justification, he implies, is the kind of tangible success that generally sat- 
isfies material interests and makes people existentially more comfortable 
with this life. 
But given the fact that he does expend much energy in writing, the intellec- 
tual part of justification must also be important to him. The portion that justi- 
fies liberal reform emphasizes the skeptical aspect of his skeptical 
pragmaticism and comes in the shape of critical history. In Civic Ideals, 
Smith appears to create his critical history by applying liberal values to the 
past in the process of reflective equilibrium. The result of that process is the 
tentative prescriptions outlined above (reject myths and conceptualize civic 
identity like party membership) and a critical social text that replaces myth as 
a historical interpretation and source of political identity. 
Smith's critical history portrays the United States as a diverse group of 
people struggling to obtain a multiplicity of goals and applying a variety of 
principles. Some of these goals and principles were not uplifting. Instead of 
a celebratory text, Smith supplies a sobering narrative. Its aim is not self- 
congratulation, but ajustification of reform that depicts life as a struggle to do 
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right. It reminds us that doing right requires continuous moral reflection and 
critique, rather than an automatic recourse to traditions or comforting stories 
that chronicle our triumphant journey to a Promised Land.33 Smith also 
intends this history to draw people into a nonascriptive, skeptical civic iden- 
tity. He argues a critical history, in conjunction with a set of shared goals and 
interests, is psychologically sufficient to this task. While shorn of glory, he 
argues that it can tie people to their community without contributing the 
visions of exceptionality and perfection that make ascriptive citizenship laws 
politically viable.34 
In contrast to this critical text, Smith comments that myths "have great, 
perhaps indispensable value" as sources of identity but argues that they are 
too risky.35 He offers several descriptions of myths in the course of dismissing 
them as undesirable. In his introduction to Civic Ideals, he cites the American 
Heritage Thesaurus to define myth as "a traditional story or tale dealing with 
ancestors, heroes, supernatural events, etc., that has no proven factual basis 
but attempts to explain beliefs, practices, or natural phenomena."36 In his 
"epilogue," he elaborates by arguing that myth is an account of civic identity 
valorized by a celebratory rendering of civic history. This valorization comes 
in part from an attempt to locate the community in a "special place in a tran- 
scendent natural or divine moral order." It also comes, he implies in discuss- 
ing the adequacy of history to provide civic identity, from the attempt to "find 
and follow a golden past full of mythic heroes."37 His definition of myth 
seems to be a collection of social texts that establish a history of "national 
superiority," invoke a natural or transcendent order, and appeal to a nation's 
heroes. 
While it seems clear that Smith rejects a celebratory history in favor of a 
critical historical account, does he in fact shun texts describing natural orders 
and our nation's heroes and rely solely upon his critical history? Is it possible 
to do without those social texts when justifying political reform? 
We can begin answering these questions by examining what Smith does 
by creating his critical history. By using liberal values to create historical 
judgments, he fashions a textual justification of ends or goals. As he illus- 
trates throughout Civic Ideals, a historical interpretation assesses how well a 
community has met its objectives. Smith analyzes American achievements 
and failures through the evidence of citizenship laws and the normative filter 
of liberal values. If we examine American history, he asks, which events 
mark a fulfillment of liberal values, and which a failure to fulfill them?38 In 
turn, Smith uses this text to justify judgments of current policies. The past 
serves as a normative as well as explanatory model by supplying lessons he 
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uses to accept or reject policies.39 He seems committed to this text alone as a 
collective source of justification. 
I argue to the contrary that people create and continually deploy, judge, 
and justify values and judgments by reference to multiple texts. As Smith 
argues with regard to political identity, they engage in these activities by giv- 
ing an account of the human condition.40 They attempt to describe human 
problems and solutions to those problems, as well as the ends they seek when 
they reflect on and use political values.4' That is why Smith is able to find a 
connection between mythic identities and the moral content of citizenship 
laws. Given that recognition, we must ask whether utilizing liberal values and 
history alone to justify criticisms and to justify the need to criticize is practi- 
cal. To use Quine's terms, isn't the field of beliefs Smith outlines too textually 
sparse and underdetermining to justify the adjustments he wishes to make to 
our traditional judgments?42 For example, could we make headway in justify- 
ing Smith's opposition to denying welfare rights to legal residents merely by 
referring to historical lessons and liberal values? Isn't his critical history less 
determining than such a move implies? 
Smith partly acknowledges this problem when discussing reflective equi- 
librium, arguing that the lack of strong foundations will always impair the 
critical process.43 Applying liberal values and historical judgments in a pro- 
cess of "horizontal" justification allows us to do no more than reach tentative 
conclusions. But given his list of the texts constituting "myth," is it the 
absence of strong foundations that accounts for the impairment given his 
understanding of reflective equilibrium, or the paucity of texts he uses? 
Smith concedes that "we still need substantive arguments as to why the equi- 
librium we should reach is some version of liberalism," as well as arguments 
that encompass universal descriptions of human behavior to sort through 
conceptions of the good.44 I maintain we also collectively require versions of 
the two "mythical" texts he rejects to justify the equilibrium he reaches and 
the judgments he makes. 
In this regard, we may plausibly ask whether Smith's account in Civic 
Ideals and other writings is as innocent of the texts constituting "myth" as he 
asserts. I believe it is not. If Smith begins his project by reflecting critically on 
our principles and practices, including an assessment of how critically we 
have reflected, upon what sources does he draw to engage in critical judg- 
ment? To understand history critically and justify particularjudgments, does- 
n't he require agreed-upon liberal texts discussing the source of human prob- 
lems and the solutions to those problems, even if philosophical foundations 
are not available? And if not from those texts, from where does the justifica- 
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tion come for viewing history critically and engaging in reflective 
equilibrium? 
SMITH, THE SELF, NATURAL ORDERS, AND HEROES 
Smith's Account of the Self and Natural Order 
If I am correct, Smith is forced to supplement his historical text in order to 
fuel his reflective discussions. To critique policies and persuade others of the 
rightness of that critique in the light of historical observations, we reference 
texts that outline the basic problems humans face and the solutions to those 
problems. Accounts of the self and natural order describe human problems, 
while portrayals of heroes identify solutions. While Smith rejects natural 
orders and texts describing heroes, I argue he assumes them as he deploys an 
account of the self, critiques historical readings, and justifies reform. 
SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE SELF 
To come to grips with Smith's account of the self and the natural order it 
implicates, we return to his project. He critiques America's historical failure 
to implement truly liberal citizenship rights. To judge whether we have 
implemented rights correctly, Smith must understand what they are and what 
they must do. If we interrogate Smith's account for the origin of rights, we 
initially find them in his historical text as traditional practices. We inherited 
the concept of rights as a tool to protect individuals and their property from 
both private and public incursions.45 But Smith does not accept our past 
understandings of rights. His stance is critical, not conservative. I think the 
critical conception he employs historically flows from his account of the self. 
Smith historically applies his critical conception of rights by criticizing 
the treatment of groups who suffered from ascriptive citizenship laws. He 
either stresses legal constructions that deny particular kinds of people equal 
political standing as citizens, such as unequal access to courts, voting, and 
other privileges. Or he underscores the presence of economic and political 
structures that favor some groups and discriminate against others.46 Rights, 
he implies, must protect us from legal inequities and from economic and 
political discrimination. Yet he also grants the legitimacy of citizenship laws, 
celebrates self-governance, accepts the concept of private property, and 
embraces a type of national identity, all of which contribute to the problems 
rights must combat. 
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We can make sense of both Smith's critical conception of rights and his 
complex view of acceptable activities by tracing them back to his general 
understanding of the origins of discrimination and inequity. That understand- 
ing draws on an account of the self as existentially anxious, self-interested, 
and morally ambiguous.47 
Smith argues that we require rights to protect us from discriminatory poli- 
cies and inequitable structures first of all because people sometimes adopt 
ascriptive conceptions of civic identity to give their lives significance. He 
concedes the need for civic identity as part of the acceptable human search for 
existential meaning, but underlines our penchant for civic myths that 
marginalize outsiders and opponents. While we may seek "civic peace" and 
"intellectual and spiritual progress" in our collective existential quest, often 
we do not, and we search instead for a sense of superiority based on national- 
ity, race, or creed.48 Smith argues that leaders often pursue power by manipu- 
lating these identities and may solidify their base by creating discriminatory 
laws and inequitable structures that satisfy the public's existential anxieties.49 
Smith also believes we need rights to combat inequity and discrimination 
because he holds the Lockean view that interests cloud our understanding of 
justice. For Smith, the pursuit of interests is not evil, but it can lead to illiberal 
public policies. He accepts that all leaders must appeal to material interests, 
yet highlights their tendency to build support by favoring particularistic inter- 
ests.50 Generally speaking, he believes that people may create material pros- 
perity and "achievements of human inventiveness and artistic creation" by 
pursuing their interests.51 But he also believes they may cooperate with politi- 
cal leaders to maximize their interests illiberally, for example, by creating an 
inequitable distribution of wealth and power that secures the ascendancy of 
the "white, propertied, European-descended but largely native-born male 
gentry."52 
Smith's morally ambiguous account of the self therefore characterizes us 
by our pursuit of self-interest and quest for existential meaning. Those activi- 
ties are dangerous, yet important and inescapable. As essentially human pur- 
suits, we must protect them. As sources of problems, we must protect our- 
selves against them. But Smith goes further. Rights can only form part of his 
solution to the problems interests and existential anxieties create. As we saw 
above, he argues that a liberal civic identity, however skeptical, is essential to 
reform, and he hopes the material improvements liberalism brings will 
appeal to citizens' interests and justify liberal policies and structures. His 
account of human ambiguity thereby does more than describe our indistinct 
character and reveal the sources of our problems. By identifying our quest for 
existential meaning and pursuit of self-interest as sources of necessary, prag- 
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matic solutions to the problems they create, it also implicates a natural order 
that defines and structures human possibilities. 
SMITH'S COMEDIC NATURAL ORDER 
This implication seems surprising because Smith rejects justification 
based on transcendent or natural orders.53 One can throw some critical light 
on this rejection by turning to Hayden White's analysis of historical interpre- 
tation.54 Borrowing from Northrop Frye's study of literary genres, White 
maintained that historical narratives inevitably encompass an account of the 
self and consequently a natural order. Using nineteenth-century historians as 
his subjects, White illustrated how their accounts of the self help structure 
their historical narratives. He argued that embedded comparisons of humans 
to Nature order historical understandings in ways that mirror the literary gen- 
res of comedy, tragedy, romance, and satire. Like the plots of literary genres, 
different kinds of natural order arise in historical narratives depending on the 
depiction of humans' relationship with Nature. For example, White suggests 
that radicals and conservatives depict humans ambivalently. The self is capa- 
ble of "provisional" victories over, and a "partial" liberation from, Nature. As 
tragedies or comedies in Frye's scheme, radical and conservative histories 
portray humans as constantly struggling to overcome the consequences of 
their moral frailties, now succeeding, now failing. When tragedies, these his- 
tories emphasize the understanding of Nature that comes with the fall of the 
tragic hero and the need to develop perfect institutions based on that knowl- 
edge. When comedies, they emphasize the equality of humans with nature 
and an equal balance of flaws and virtues. This condition of equality includes 
the possibility of temporary "reconciliations" of conflicting forces that make 
triumphs over Nature possible. 
Liberal and anarchist histories tend to adopt quite different natural orders, 
White asserts. He argues that because liberals view humans as "captives" of 
Nature, their histories have an affinity for satires by Frye's criteria. They 
emphasize irony, skepticism, and the need to contextualize analyses and pre- 
scriptions. Anarchist histories in turn view tragic, comedic, and satirical his- 
tories as all criminally skeptical of humanity's future. Anarchists depict 
human resources as powerful enough not only to solve particular problems 
but also to eliminate the source of problems and the need for institutions. As 
romances in Frye's scheme, their histories point to a transcendence, in which 
human nature changes and we complete our triumph over Nature. 
If White is correct, every historical narrative implicates a natural order, 
through its account of the self, that links the narrative to a political position. 
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As we saw above, Smith employs a morally ambiguous account of the self 
that identifies human flaws that prevent transcendence, but which nonethe- 
less are the basis of progress. I therefore argue he employs a comedic order, 
influenced by satire, that supports a liberal politics. While White argues that a 
comedic emplotment combined with an "organic mode of argument" has an 
"elective affinity" with conservatism and links liberalism with contextualist 
modes of argument and satirical implotments, his discussions of satirical 
comedies and "elective affinities" suggests that a mixture of comedy and sat- 
ire combined with a contextual mode of argument would support a liberal 
position like Smith's.55 
In assuming that humans have a relationship of equality with Nature, 
White's comedies identify a rough balance between human flaws and innate 
human resources. If Smith's account does presume a satirically comedic nat- 
ural order, we will detect in his historical account two themes that flow from 
that balance. The first theme is the possibility of progress. For example, a 
comedy might hold that self-interest leads us away from morally justified 
positions. But it would also hold that particular manifestations of this prob- 
lem could be solved by the systematic application of rationality to a long- 
range view of self-interest. While self-interest can triumph over morality and 
rationality, a comedy would assume that we can and must generate principles 
and political structures that successfully, though temporarily, address the 
problems self-interest creates. 
This leads to the second comedic theme: the rejection of transcendence in 
favor of temporary reconciliations. Because comedies presuppose a balance 
between problems and innate resources, their position in favor of progress is 
tempered by the judgment that we cannot reach the ultimate source of prob- 
lems. For instance, the theme of a historical account might be the efficacy of 
human efforts to rid society of existing injustices. If it is a comedy, it will also 
warn that we cannot eliminate the tendency to create unjust structures. 
Despite the room they leave for progress, comedies hold that we will always 
live in political and social environments that mirror the self's moral ambigu- 
ity. Transcending problems in general, as opposed to solving particular prob- 
lems, entails changing human nature. This is impossible in a comedic world. 
All we can ever hope for are temporary triumphs over Nature. 
The first indication that Smith does assume a comedic natural order lies in 
his criticism of Sandel's "encumbered self." Smith argues that Sandel's 
account of human agency is deficient when it comes to choosing among com- 
peting moral duties. It also lacks a normative basis for resisting immoral obli- 
gations to constitutive communities. He concludes that this view of the self is 
too complacent. It wants the fruitful empirical characterizations by which to 
account for America's failures and therefore does not locate the need for the 
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reform Smith deems both possible and crucial.56 What is at the bottom of this 
critique? Smith does not criticize Sandel for espousing the wrong values, but 
for conceptualizing the self in such a way as to remove the ontological case 
for reform as both necessary and possible. Does Smith then point to the possi- 
bility of transcendence? He does describe people as capable of sorting 
through allegiances to communities with liberal principles as their guide, 
critically judging existing principles in light of historical knowledge, and rec- 
ognizing obligations to humanity as whole.57 But he also describes otherwise 
admirable individuals vigorously pursuing their interests at the expense of 
principle and happily excluding and demonizing "others."58 This indicates a 
conception of the self that embodies a rough equality between human flaws 
and innate resources, predicating a comedic natural order. 
Smith's historical analysis in Civic Ideals confirms this judgment. There 
we find comedy's twin themes: the possibility of progress and a strong skepti- 
cism of transcendence. Smith asserts that liberalism has stimulated progress 
in America, even if problems still remain. He acknowledges our capacity to 
remedy political injustices, pointing to our success in resolving many prob- 
lems involving race and gender. Despite his scathing critique, he ends his 
book by affirming our accomplishments as the basis for a more fulfilling civic 
life. His purpose in writing a critical history is to spur reform.59 
Yet this history also throws considerable doubt on our capacity ever to 
solve all our problems and fulfill liberal values. In explicit contrast to 
Tocqueville's story of our advance out of the dark days of feudalism, Smith's 
historical narrative in Civic Ideals portrays a series of confusions and contra- 
dictions attributable to civic identities and the pursuit of interests. In Smith's 
view, social and political progress is always mixed with reaction. He 
describes early liberal gains that were often later lost and laments how liberal 
progress on one front failed to spread to others. He portrays successful legal 
attempts to base citizenship on liberal democratic principles coinciding with 
cultural setbacks. He pairs off material progress in the sciences with the 
growth of scientific racism. He emphasizes that in the 1850s, African Ameri- 
cans had lost the citizenship rights they had earlier gained in some states. He 
couples the postwar amendments with the federal courts' refusal to imple- 
ment them vigorously, and likewise notes that feminist achievements were 
unaccompanied by attacks on Jim Crow.60 His purpose in rejecting 
Tocqueville's characterization of our history, it seems, is not only to justify 
reform but also to discount a future transcendence and to paint progress as a 
moving target.61 
By characterizing our history, and our future, as a progressive story inevi- 
tably marred by failures and injustices, Smith unconsciously embraces a par- 
ticular type of comedic natural order, a satirical, ironic one in which the bal- 
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ance between our human flaws and innate resources flows from their 
common origins. According to Smith, we can translate liberal principles into 
political structures by appealing to material interests and creating liberal 
civic identities. But as a critical history illustrates, our interests and existen- 
tial anxieties also lead us away from those principles and tarnish our institu- 
tions. Thus, our ironic moral ambiguity requires that we remain skeptical and 
vigilant even as we pursue progress and that we adopt a contextual rather than 
organic method for analyzing and understanding the world. 
Smith's critical style ofjustification is responsive to and dependent on this 
comedic natural order and its underlying account of the self, both of which 
are influenced by the contextualism and irony of satire. The resulting text 
embraces reform but rejects political transcendence. Smith most transpar- 
ently obeys its logical imperative when he identifies and engages Sandel and 
Tocqueville as authors of rival civic ideals. By criticizing Sandel, he privi- 
leges progress by distinguishing between our principles, on the one hand, and 
our institutions and identities, on the other. He demands that we choose prin- 
ciples, and the hope and moral duties implicit in reform, over the situated life 
Sandel favors.62 But by rejecting Tocqueville, he also dismisses the possibil- 
ity of redemption through liberal practices. Smith's ambivalent assessment of 
our innate resources, and subsequently of our ability to apply principles with- 
out distorting them, tempers his hope. That ambivalence consequently 
grounds a skepticism of our practical moral understandings equal in strength 
to his commitment to reform.63 
The subsequent civic ideal Smith commends to us in general, and with 
which he confronts all rivals, duly balances reform with skepticism. Reflec- 
tive equilibrium supplies its civic philosophy, in the form of a moving bal- 
ance of principle and pragmatic application. A detached conception of citi- 
zenship is its instrument of choice. Tempered by a pragmatically justified 
liberalism, that conception aims for temporary comedic reconciliations of the 
individual with her community. Its final component is the citizen's duty to 
remain skeptical both within and outside times of reconciliation. 
A satirically comedic natural order and its accompanying account of the 
self therefore justify Smith's civic ideal. Collectively as a text they 
problematize the human condition, as does Locke's conception of the state of 
nature in his justification of limited government, and Spencer's depiction of 
human evolution in social structures in his justification of a laissez-faire state. 
Remove this text and Smith fails to supply persuasive reasons why his pre- 
scriptions are relevant to the questions his historical narrative raises. 
Smith does not recognize that he employs this text. Nor does he detect his 
assumption that we also embrace it.64 This lack of recognition is a testament 
to its power. In Smith's comedic view, in which humans are by definition 
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beings that struggle continuously to fulfill their moral duties, a historical 
interpretation based on the endless human struggle to fulfill our moral princi- 
ples is incontestably true. Any other historical interpretation is part of a myth. 
Smith should argue that we must collectively deploy a comedic natural order 
and related accounts of the self in justifications. That he fails to do so does not 
falsify his underlying conclusion-that other accounts may justify ascriptive 
definitions of citizenship. But we must modify his prescription. We should 
not strive to eliminate all accounts of natural order. Rather we should reject 
purely romantic or tragic accounts and cautiously and consciously put for- 
ward comedic accounts influenced by satire. To hold otherwise is to pursue 
an impractical goal-justifying a critical posture in the absence of necessary 
social texts. Or it means being imprisoned in the belief that Smith adopts a 
transparently, incontestably true account of natural order, an assumption he 
falsifies by highlighting instances in which people embraced quite different 
accounts. 
Smith's Use of Texts Referencing 
Heroes and Villains 
Aside from accounts of the self and natural order, Smith deploys another 
"mythic" text-an outline of how we resolve problems. This is the realm of 
heroes. 
Smith objects to a text of heroes because it blinds citizens to the faults and 
errors of the persons so described, thereby contributing to the romanticized 
history he rejects. That is why anti-heroes tend to outnumber the heroes in his 
account. Yet Smith is inevitably drawn to the rhetoric of personal example 
that even his anti-heroes provide negatively. While arguing against the notion 
that a history filled with accounts of "saints" is necessary to bind people to a 
community, Smith admits that people will identify heroes and villains in his 
historical narrative, thus conceding the rhetorical necessity of such argu- 
ments in social texts.65 In Civic Ideals, it is clear that Samuel George Morton, 
John Calhoun, Henry Cabot Lodge, Charles Francis Adams, John R. Com- 
mons, and the others Smith describes as justifying or implementing 
ascriptive laws play their allotted roles of how not to be a citizen if one wants 
to attain a truly liberal democratic country. Meanwhile, George Washington, 
Thurgood Marshall, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Abraham Lincoln transpar- 
ently play the hero in "America's Contents and Discontents."66 They solve the 
problem of identity by not embracing and implementing ascriptive values. 
These depictions of heroes and anti-heroes perform important collective 
functions in Smith's argument. First, they bridge the distance between 
descriptions of general human problems and the success or failure to achieve 
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the ends of the community. Where accounts of the self and natural order point 
to the source of errors, the nature of human inadequacy, and the extent of 
human ignorance, shared accounts of heroes and anti-heroes provide infor- 
mation about solutions, sources of potency, and the nature of true knowledge. 
Thus, in his account of heroes, Smith provides a solution to the problem of 
our need for existential meaning in a model of citizenship that embraces a dis- 
tanced, critical attitude toward state and history and eschews ascriptive anal- 
ysis in all its forms. 
Accounts of heroes and anti-heroes also bridge the distance between 
abstract prescriptions and practical behavior. As citizens, how do we know 
which policy positions to embrace or reject? By invoking figures that embod- 
ied or rejected the model of citizenship Smith endorses, he derives from them 
collective criteria, in the form of personal examples and articulated princi- 
ples, which he uses to sort through current policies and justify his judgments. 
In referencing what the cast of characters in Civic Ideals did by using 
ascriptive accounts to nefarious political advantage, he can identify 
"ascriptive" policies and justify his opposition to them. Likewise by refer- 
encing how Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, Jr. used liberal values 
to benefit humanity as a whole by rejecting the "public philosophy to be 'for 
ourselves only,' " he identifies progressive policies and justifies support for 
them. Why should we defend a federal safety net for the poor? Because 
Franklin Roosevelt did. Why should we oppose ascriptive restrictions on 
immigration? Because Henry Cabot Lodge supported them. 
THE PRACTICAL NEED TO EMPLOY MULTIPLE 
TEXTS IN REFLECTIVE QUILIBRIUM 
Thus, Smith uses precisely the kinds of collective texts he considers dan- 
gerous, and he does so out of the practical need to justify his position. In order 
to further illuminate the character of this need, I want to outline the role mul- 
tiple texts play in justifying critiques of two kinds of policy. The first is an 
ascriptive policy justified by a mixture of liberal concepts with an ascriptive 
tradition. The second is an illiberal, possibly ascriptive, policy justified by 
liberal concepts and historical references. 
Liberal History and the 
Case of the Know-Nothings 
A large part of Smith's purpose in Civic Ideals is to defend liberal values 
from the charge that they generate ascriptive conceptions of citizenship. For 
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Smith, the explanation for America's contradictory history of realizing the 
ends of liberal democracy is not that the values are flawed but that humans are 
not up to the task. Thus, he provides "social psychological and political" 
explanations for our failures.67 But while Smith concedes some liberal com- 
plicity with ascriptive perceptions of citizenship, I believe he goes too far in 
exculpating liberal history and classical liberal writings. The problems asso- 
ciated with liberal texts are not confined to self-interested bigots using Locke 
to justify pushing Native Americans off desirable real estate. They also 
encompass the history of liberalism and classical liberal commentaries on 
freedom, both of which have been used to support illiberal policies. If our aim 
is reform, we must justify a critical stance toward "liberal" history and disen- 
tangle liberal principles from ascriptive traditions. I argue the requisite criti- 
cal stance requires collective texts that provide accounts of the self, natural 
order, and heroes.68 
To illustrate, let us take the case of the nineteenth-century Know-Nothings. 
As Smith concedes through his references to Linda Colley's Britons and his 
acknowledgment of the continuing identification of liberal democracy with 
Protestantism, liberal democracy's history in early modem Britain and 
America was intimately caught up with religious identity.69 And it is not at all 
clear, as Smith argues with regard to liberalism and patriarchy, that liberal 
freedom and religious identity were "intertwined but relatively autonomous 
systems of ideas and practices."70 In fact, it seems that liberal ideas and prac- 
tices and a conception of Protestant identity were tightly interconnected in 
both Great Britain and the United States from the time of Locke to the middle 
of the nineteenth century. It is no fluke that Milton, Locke, Dissenters, and 
Whigs exclude Catholics from the ranks of those allowed political toleration, 
even if they do so on illiberal grounds.7' 
The Know-Nothings of the 1840s and 1850s exploited this historical con- 
ceptualization to campaign against Catholics' rights to vote and hold public 
office. For example, Anna Ella Carroll argued in support of the Know-Nothing 
position that "every Romish priest and prelate in this land... swear[s] thus to 
cherish every influence that shall hasten the destruction of American liberty, 
and enable them to establish an Inquisition to bur the Protestant population, 
and then hold ajubilee."72 Frederick Anspach argued that Jesuits were active 
in conspiring against American political institutions.73 Thomas Whitney 
argued that Catholics were dire threats to "assail our Constitution and our 
laws, and make war against our institutions... [to] drag their religion into the 
public arena and declare their determination to make their church the ruling 
power." The measures taken against them were not taken out of a hostility to 
the Catholicism, but because the Catholic "avowed himself the political foe 
of our free institutions and he has assailed those institutions."74 
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In confronting the Know-Nothings, it is obvious that despite their attach- 
ment to the concept of freedom, appealing to liberal democratic principles 
alone is insufficient to justify opposition to their program. An anthropologi- 
cal identification of religious convictions with adherence to liberal principles 
has already taken place in their arguments, becoming part of their under- 
standing of liberal democracy.75 It is therefore clear that invoking a critical 
history of religious discrimination would be insufficient to justify a critique 
of their position. One attacks the branches, not the root of the argument, since 
judgments regarding particular events can differ fundamentally. People draw 
a variety of lessons from that history. Point to instances of Catholic suppres- 
sion of Protestants as a reason why we should not suppress anyone, and the 
reply will be that Catholic governments suppress in the name of religious 
conformity. The proposed political disabilities differ. Their purpose is not 
religious conformity, but political defense. Point to Catholic disabilities over 
the years and argue that they are incompatible with the principles of political 
equality, and the reply will be that such examples only serve to validate the 
anti-Catholic position. As various Know-Nothing platforms assert, echoing 
earlier defenses of the British Test and Corporation Acts, commitment to the 
principles of freedom and democracy justify actions taken in their defense. If, 
they argue, ancestors enshrined in the liberal canon felt compelled to guard 
free institutions against the Catholic threat, going back to the Gunpowder 
Plot and the Glorious Revolution, then we are justified and indeed obliged to 
do the same.76 
To justify a critique of this position, we need anthropological and bio- 
graphical materials to supply substance and definition to our history and the 
liberal principles we embrace. We must counter the Know-Nothings' anthro- 
pology of religious fallibility and political omniscience and their Protestant- 
based natural order. We do so by creating texts that describe our political fal- 
libility and our potential for reform. 
We find such materials in Smith's own account of morally ambiguous 
humans who must commit themselves to progress and skepticism. Using 
Smith's view of the self, we can defend the proposition that humans are the 
same no matter their religious affiliations. Our existential anxiety and attach- 
ment to self-interest, not religious denomination, are the markers of our 
humanity. This makes Catholics and non-Catholics anthropologically equal 
in their capacity to embrace liberal democratic principles and in their illiberal 
susceptibilities. We can concede a connection between Protestantism and lib- 
eral democracy but describe it as a historical rather than anthropological 
contact. 
We can go on to propose that the relevant problem we face in examining 
religious ascription is to continue understanding how to apply liberal values 
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despite the political structures we inherit, structures that sometimes contain 
prejudicial elements created by the contingencies of particular political 
events. Our world, we would emphasize, is a comedic place, not the Know- 
Nothings' romantic Protestant ideal. Liberal democracy did not spring up 
fully formed here, nor is it fully formed now. Despite the contributions of past 
liberal heroes, their work is neither complete nor definitive in terms of liberal 
doctrine and policy. Liberalism, we can argue, is an evolving philosophy. Its 
political structures likewise must evolve through sustained critical reflection. 
We must also provide a counter set of heroes to provide examples of the 
solution to this problem. These may be people like George Washington, 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Isaac Backus, a Protestant minister 
instrumental in arguing against religious tests for state offices early in the 
nineteenth century.77 They all rejected the historical treatment of Catholics 
and viewed the question of state and religion cautiously. 
In this way, we can give a point to history different from the one Know- 
Nothings supply. Liberal history can become what Smith desires: a narrative 
of noble attempts and misguided failures, of people striving their best to live 
up to their principles, though now seen to have been blind to their faults in 
labeling competing religious denominations as congenitally hostile to free- 
dom and democracy. But Smith's potential argument against the Know- 
Nothing position finds justification only when it is informed by texts incorpo- 
rating accounts of the self, natural order, and a compelling set of heroes. Oth- 
erwise, his position bogs down on questions of how we interpret and judge 
history. 
Contemporary Advocates of 
Organized Prayer in Public Schools 
The second problem that illuminates the need to draw upon multiple social 
texts arises when politicians invoke liberal concepts and history to justify 
illiberal and ascriptive policies. How can we clarify the meaning of these con- 
cepts in ways Smith approves when history is the only social text we have 
available? The case here involves contemporary proponents of organized 
prayer in public schools. This is a practice Smith argues is contrary to liberal 
principles.78 However, proponents quite often invoke liberal arguments to 
justify it and rarely invoke ascriptive stories. 
Proponents of organized religion in public schools who use liberal argu- 
ments embrace two themes. One focuses on free expression. These argu- 
ments deploy the concepts of freedom and rights, maintaining that any move 
to curtail religion in schools entails an illiberal abrogation of individual 
autonomy.79 An absolutist position on negative liberty and the Free Exercise 
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Clause governs this underlying understanding of religion's relationship with 
state and society. The second theme picks up on overtones of ascriptive jeop- 
ardy in the previous arguments. It borrows rhetoric from the victims of past 
ascriptive policies that highlights unequal treatment and hostility based on 
outward characteristics. If the previous theme stresses a threat to rights and 
freedom, here the emphasis is on the religious character of the people whose 
rights are allegedly violated. The primary concepts are therefore discrimina- 
tion, intolerance, and coercion.80 
Significantly, these references to liberal concepts and the First Amend- 
ment are often supplemented by references to history. Proponents point to the 
Declaration of Independence, early proclamations of days of fasting, govern- 
ment support for religious missions to Native Americans, the use of chaplains 
in legislatures and the armed forces, and the references to God in the Pledge 
of Allegiance, patriotic songs, and currency as historical practices that 
involved religion with the state. 
It may be clear to critics that this understanding of liberal concepts is sim- 
ple and incomplete and that the history invoked needs critical review. How- 
ever, while a critical history is helpful in providing empirical examples of 
how these religious practices may marginalize people, the question is ulti- 
mately how we create that history and whether raw historical materials plus 
liberal values are sufficient texts upon which to rely. 
I argue that a critical history only works if all the participants in the discus- 
sion agree on which historical events to view critically and which lessons to 
draw. In this case, to apply liberal values alone to those past situations in 
which religious minorities were psychologically pressured by organized reli- 
gious practices does not suffice to create a persuasive justification for ending 
those practices in the eyes of proponents. Adherents of organized prayer in 
public places embrace rather than reject those practices. They justify reinstat- 
ing organized public prayers on the grounds of unbroken tradition. They 
argue that our ancestors, in allowing such practices, correctly interpreted reli- 
gious freedom. We should defer to those ancestral judgments. And rather 
than viewing seriously protests against those religious practices, some cur- 
rent proponents label them the product of a minority bent on removing the 
Christian majority's freedoms and rights. 
To combat these arguments, we need to justify the judgment that such 
practices were not and are not compatible with liberal principles. We need 
texts that justify a critical account of our history itself. 
In this case, we need an anthropology that stresses fallibility in under- 
standing the connection of diversity with the many sides of freedom. Again 
drawing upon Smith, it might run like this. Humans try to follow liberal prin- 
ciples but are blinded by interests and existential anxieties. One way that 
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interests and anxieties blind people is by conflating their existential answers, 
and the interests that accompany those answers, with their conception of the 
community. People then justify using institutions to enforce their particular 
interests by claiming they are promoting the common interest. 
One can use this gloss of Smith's comedic understanding of natural order 
to justify a critical stance toward past policies. If transcendence is impossible, 
we must understand that our interests and existential answers always tempt us 
to create institutions that marginalize some citizens. We therefore have a gen- 
eral responsibility to act as moral agents in our relationship to the community. 
Each citizen should view himself or herself as an equal part of a differentiated 
group. Each must continually strive not only to preserve equality and free- 
dom for oneself, but for all in the form of truly liberal policies and institu- 
tions. This means each has a duty to recognize and combat the tendency to 
equate himself or herself with the community, as well as an obligation to criti- 
cize policies and institutions that attempt to standardize interests. 
This account is useful because it explicitly situates in an account of the self 
and natural order the relevant political problem humans must overcome to 
realize liberal principles: their existential and interest-driven incapacity to 
recognize differences. Only by recognizing all differences will we allow each 
person, in Rawlsian terms, the maximum freedom compatible with the like 
freedom for all. We can extend this account into history by affirming that this 
project is endless. We cannot smugly point to history and assume that our 
ancestors recognized all relevant differences. To view history as a continual 
struggle to realize liberal principles justifies our assertion that our ancestors 
were wrong to conclude that denominational differences were irrelevant 
when it comes to practicing religion in public places. 
We can then supplement these textual accounts of the self, natural order, 
and history with a discussion of people who have struggled to overcome the 
conflation of the situated self with communal identity. One such a hero might 
be James Madison. His "Memorial and Remonstrance," cited by several 
Supreme Court justices in cases involving the First Amendment establish- 
ment clause, reveals a man sensitive to the problems of religious conviction 
and political involvement with religious beliefs. We might also point to Stan- 
ley Matthews, a Presbyterian who in the 1870s courageously argued against 
the continued use of the King James Bible in Cincinnati's public schools.81 
CONCLUSION 
I agree with Smith that his prescription of a tentative political identity and 
reflective equilibrium is less risky than Sandel's deference toward preexist- 
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ing community obligations, or a Tocquevillian celebration of American 
achievements. But Smith fails to recognize how his understandings of the 
self, natural order, history, and heroes structure the critical picture he paints 
of American history and civic identity. The observation that people crave cer- 
tainty and definition in their lives, leading them to take up ascriptive 
accounts, should underline the conclusion that people employ a large range 
of collective texts in their critical reflection. Practically speaking, we cannot 
rely on a historical text alone for purposes of justification. To justify criti- 
cisms of history, policies, and institutions in a popular setting, and thus sup- 
port reform, we must employ social texts that provide a broader account of 
the human condition. As Quine argues, criticism affects afield of beliefs. 
Even horizontal justification requires a rich variety of texts.82 
There are of course problems with this position. One is creating flexible 
texts that remain true to the skeptical spirit Smith adopts. Indeed, it is difficult 
to determine whether a hard distinction between multiple social texts (which 
I argue are necessary) and philosophical foundations (of which Smith is dubi- 
ous) is ultimately tenable. Part of the solution might lie in the tractably foun- 
dational, "weak ontologies" Stephen White describes. Such ontologies are 
fundamental yet contestable, provide a "sticky" account of the self, describe 
the self as aesthetic and affective as well as cognitive, and cultivate reflection 
by serving only to "prefigure practical insight or judgment, in the sense of 
providing broad cognitive and affective orientation."83 Adopting such an 
account of the self would undercut the rigidity that Smith hints leads to 
ascriptive identities, while providing an account of human problems by 
which to interpret history. 
A complementary approach entails thinking about all texts from the stand- 
point of literary genres. Since Frye conceptualizes comedy as a mixture of 
tragedy and romance, the flexibility and critical position we seek might be 
found by adjusting the mixture of each, along with satire, within our texts. 
When we incorporate romanticism as the constant search for progress, we 
obtain critical purchase by encouraging a restless inability to accept the status 
quo. Meanwhile, when we emphasize the tragic notion that humans are 
flawed and the ironic concept that the source of progress is our faults, we 
inform a critical stance toward all policies, including proposed reforms, and 
stress the continuing need to understand and confront human weaknesses. 
This emphasis on unceasing criticism must also extend to our texts as 
sources of justification. While we know ourselves to be existentially anxious 
and self-interested, we also know that texts can never account for all our slip- 
pery moral ambiguities. We must be aware that particular textual mixtures of 
romance, tragedy, and satire might unconsciously soothe our anxieties with 
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ascriptive accounts and furtively and inequitably serve our interests. Our 
accounts of the self, natural order, critical history, and heroes may therefore 
justify unrecognized inequities and discrimination. To guard against this pos- 
sibility, we continually must ask whether our desire for change textually 
understands the nature of present disabilities or merely justifies a quest for a 
constricted Promised Land. We should also query whether our critical spirit 
textually appreciates existing inequities or narrowly serves our own interests. 
Because we cannot portray ourselves in full, we must be textually cautious, 
recognizing that reform requires a critical attitude towards the very texts that 
justify criticism and reformation. 
Further problems arise regarding the textual vehicles of justification. We 
do not want to replace one unitextual form, like Smith's critical history, with 
another based only on an account of an acceptable natural order or a relevant 
description of heroes. How do we then incorporate multiple texts into collec- 
tive accounts that retain the critical and reflective character Smith prizes? 
One solution is to beef up Smith's critical history by making explicit the 
multiple texts he employs. This would remove what he perceives as a virtue 
of his Civic Ideals. However, given that he does (in my view) provide these 
texts below the surface, making them explicit would serve merely to heighten 
the degree of critical reflection they would foster. Another possibility is to 
adopt the critical, allegorical history pioneered by George Orwell. Taking 
Animal Farm and 1984 as our models, we might critique policies and advo- 
cate change by displacing events and personalities into fictional settings. By 
freeing us from the confines of conventional political texts, such accounts 
might allow us to explore more deeply our moral ambiguities and to search 
more widely for unrecognized sources of marginalization and discrimination 
in our accounts of history, natural order, and heroes.84 
Accounts of actors grappling with complex political problems might pro- 
vide a third source of critical reflection. These accounts would take the form 
of philosophically explicit, historically situated, critical biography. Because 
they discoursively emphasize solutions to problems, biographies possess a 
practical focus. Thus, they are less likely to stray into the speculative abstrac- 
tions Smith disdains. To reflect our ironically comedic understanding of the 
world, we would not confine such accounts to readily identifiable heroes and 
villains but would also seek out morally ambiguous figures. Indeed, all our 
biographies should stress their subjects' moral ambiguities, even if we view 
those subjects as heroes. Isaac Backus is a good example. While he is a hero 
of stories about the elimination of religious tests, he believed teaching 
Protestant religious doctrines in public schools was morally justified and 
socially necessary. We should explore the complex lives of similar people to 
reflect on and debate the examples they provide.85 
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To sum up, I believe Smith's civic ideal of critically pursuing liberal 
democracy is more difficult to attain than even his sophisticated account 
allows. Even if we discard foundational justifications, we still must textually 
invest in our community in order to justify a sustained program of reform. If 
Smith's fear of strong political identities leads him to abandon the textually 
rich justifications he identifies with "myth," I argue he must ultimately 
choose between that fear and the critical project he advocates. But this choice 
should not surprise him. Can we expect transcendence of our social texts 
when as liberals we assert that transcendence is impossible? 
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